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THE MISAPPLICATION OF GARCETTI IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
Matthew Jay Hertzog* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tenure, as currently implemented in American colleges and 
universities, provides academics a high degree of job security. 
However, over the past few decades, with the financial 
restraints placed on public institutions due to the lack of state 
and federal funding and declining enrollment in certain 
disciplines, the value of tenure is being raised by university 
administrators, the media, the public at large and politicians.1 
These discussions on tenure primarily address faculty 
productivity and accountability when institutions attempt to 
remove a tenured faculty member.  In addition, most colleges 
and universities have some form of tenure, resulting in a two 
class faculty system which may impact the faculty member’s’ 
academic freedom.2  Although there are various approaches to 
higher education in the United States,3 the institution of higher 
education has focused on protection of faculty members from 
wrongful termination, or more so, termination without due 
 
*Matthew Jay Hertzog is the Director of Educational Technology at Methodist College. 
He is responsible for the management of the college’s online learning system. He also 
served as an Associate Dean at Illinois Central College from 2005 – 2011. He received 
his Ph.D. from Illinois State University in Higher Education Administration with an 
emphasis in Educational Law. 
 1  Neil Gross and Solon Simmons, Americans’ Views of Political Bias in the 
Academy and Academic Freedom 13–14 (Working Paper May 22, 2006), 
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/DCF3EBD7-509E-47AB-9AB3-
FBCFFF5CA9C3/0/2006Gross.pdf (Gross and Simmons, with the help of Princeton 
Survey Research Associates International in conducting the survey, found that out of a 
thousand randomly questioned Americans, 80.7% believed that tenure protects 
incompetent faculty.  Furthermore, 57.9% surveyed believe that awarding tenure to 
faculty removes incentives for hard work). 
 2  For the specific purpose of this article, the two class faculty system created 
within higher education consists of tenured track and non-tenured track faculty. 
 3  For the specific purpose of this article, the various approaches of higher 
education in the United States include junior colleges, private four year institutions, 
research institutions and typical four-year institutions. 
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process, as well as the academic freedom to discuss 
controversial topics in the classroom.4  Similarly, the same 
rights that are awarded to faculty through the protection of 
tenure and academic freedom also provide students an 
opportunity to question theories presented in their courses of 
study.5 
The rights and freedoms afforded by tenure and academic 
freedom did not coalesce until 1915, when the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) put forth the goals 
of what has become known as tenure and academic freedom.  
In a document drafted by the AAUP, the goals of tenure and 
academic freedom include: 1) protection of a faculty member’s 
academic freedom in the classroom and 2) protection of the 
faculty member’s ability to perform other job duties without the 
fear of termination.6  However, with the decision reached by 
the United States Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos 
(2006), the Court stated that “when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties”7 the protections 
afforded through the First Amendment are not available.8  This 
statement set the precedent for university administration to 
apply the Garcetti decision to faculty claims of violation of their 
academic freedom. 
II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE TENURE AS A NATIONAL 
STANDARD 
Tenure as a vehicle to provide job security for faculty in 
American higher education can be traced back to the early 
Twentieth Century,9 although other avenues to provide faculty 
job security can be seen as far back as the European 
 
 4  Walter Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in 
FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION ON 
ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 148–49 (London: GB: Jossey-Bass, Ltd., 
Publishers 1973) EDUCATION (London: GB: Jossey-Bass, Ltd., Publishers, 1973). 
 5  Id. 
 6  History of the AAUP, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 
(Nov. 6, 2013, 9:21 AM), http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/about/history. 
 7  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (This decision established that 
speech related to an employee’s daily work did not receive 1st Amendment protection). 
   8  Id. 
 9  Melanie Peterson, Academic Tenure and Higher Education in the United 
States: Implications for the Dental Education Workforce in the Twenty-First Century, 
71:3 JOURNAL OF DENTAL EDUCATION, 355 (2007). 
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universities of the Twelfth Century.10  Prior to the arrival of 
tenure in American universities, faculty in higher education 
were retained in their positions on informal yearly contracts.11  
These contracts were referred to as “gentlemen’s agreements” 
because they were between gentlemen who were predominately 
the university administration and the professor.12  Contracts 
such as these placed a faculty member’s continuation of 
employment at the whim of the university administration or 
wealthy donors who funded various aspects of the university.13  
This collegial arrangement changed, however, in the early part 
of the Twentieth Century when Edward Ross, a Stanford 
University professor, was summarily terminated for publicly 
taking stand on issues deemed unacceptable by the wife of 
Stanford’s founder.14  Ross’s termination is seen as a catalyst 
for the formation of the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP), an organization based on a fundamental 
tenet that formalized tenure and academic freedom among 
faculty in higher education.15 
With ever increasing demands for productivity and 
scholarship coming from moneyed benefactors and external 
political forces placed on faculty, as well as university 
administrators terminating faculty for not adhering to 
university religious or political beliefs, the AAUP sought to 
codify its position on job security/tenure during its initial 
meeting in 1915.16 The original position taken by this 
 
 10  Metzger, supra note 4, at 94. 
 11  Peterson, supra note 9, at 355. 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id. 
 14  William Tierney and Estela Bensimon, Promotion and Tenure: Community 
and Socialization in Academe 23 (1996) (Ross spoke out publicly against several 
controversial topics of the time: 1) municipal ownership of public utilities; 2) his public 
support for railway union strikes; and 3) how the use of Asian laborers instead of the 
European-American working class was destructive for the United States working 
classes’ wellbeing. Ross’s statements went directly against the business practices of 
Leland Stanford, the founder of Stanford University.  When Stanford’s widow learned 
of his statements, she demanded Ross’s immediate termination. The university 
president adhered to her demand and Ross was terminated because of his views on 
immigrant labor and train monopolies). 
 15  Id. 
 16  Metzger, supra note 4, at 135–36 (There were two goals that the AAUP had 
when drafting its 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic 
Tenure.  These goals were: 1) to provide a means for protecting a faculty members 
academic freedom in and outside of the classroom; and 2) to provide a safeguard for 
faculty to perform other duties, such as research, without fear of reprimand from 
university administration). 
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association on tenure and academic freedom included a ten-
year probationary period, during which time new faculty were 
to have annual reviews to determine their so-called fit with 
university life.17  Areas considered essential to university life 
for faculty, and therefore under yearly review, included the 
faculty member’s proficiency in three distinct components 
related to academic life.18  These areas remain the foundation 
for tenure decisions and address: teaching/providing quality 
instruction; service to the university and community as a 
whole; and scholarly research/publications which are often 
further delineated depending on the discipline.19 
Initially, many higher education institutions did not comply 
with the AAUP’s recommendations on tenure;20 however, in 
1940, the association revised its tenure position and 
recommended that the probationary period be reduced from ten 
years to seven years.21  Following the end of World War II, 
university enrollments began to swell with returning veterans 
entering higher education, spurred by financial assistance 
 
 17  1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 300 (Dec. 13, 2013, 11:29 PM), 
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1915.htm (In the AAUP’s 1915 
Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, the organization 
stated their position on principles and clarified concepts on the topic of academic 
freedom and tenure.  According to the AAUP, academic freedom is essential to quality 
research and instruction and should be awarded to all academic professionals.  
Similarly, academic tenure is a “means to an end” and is essential to the safeguarding 
of academic freedom). 
 18  Id. 
 19  Faculty Appointment, Salary, Promotion, and Tenure Policies, ILLINOIS 
STATE UNIVERSITY, 32–34 (Nov. 27, 2013 4:35 PM), 
http://provost.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/aspt/ASPTmasterAugust2011.pdf. (An 
example of the components needed for promotion and tenure is seen in Illinois State 
University’s policy for promotion). 
 20  According to Roger Geiger in Perspectives on the History of Higher Education 
(2008), many universities throughout the country failed to implement the AAUP’s 
recommendation for a 10 year probationary period due to the fact that there was no 
agreement for a set probationary period between the two leading teacher unions at the 
time, the AAUP and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT).  The AAUP in its 
1915 Declaration recommended a ten year probation period for newly hired faculty 
members. The other leading teacher union, the AFT, promoted a three year probation 
period for all newly hired teachers. 
 21  1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940statement.htm (Nov. 6, 
2013, 10:10 PM) (Additionally, with the release of the 1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure, academic tenure and academic freedom were identified 
as being inseparable and vital to the instruction provided by faculty within academia). 
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provided through the Montgomery GI Bill.22  Universities 
looked for incentives to retain existing faculty as well as 
inducements for new faculty. At this point, institutions of 
higher education began to view tenure as a benefit of 
employment and therefore implemented the AAUP’s 
recommendation for acquiring tenure following a seven-year 
probationary period.23 
As universities moved forward based on the AAUP 
recommendations, the probationary period gave administration 
an opportunity to determine how the faculty member 
interacted with students and peers and provided the 
administration time to evaluate the value of the individual to 
the university.  Even though newly hired faculty were given 
the opportunity for tenure, university administrators found 
that if non-tenured faculty were not awarded tenure, they 
could then seek legal recourse to challenge the administration’s 
decision.24  Attempts to have the courts reverse university 
tenure decisions have primarily been unsuccessful due to 
various state and university policies adopted for the acquisition 
of tenure. 
Because the path to tenure has a professor undergo periodic 
review of three components deemed essential for success in 
university life as well as a probationary period of seven years, 
universities have found it difficult and costly to dismiss an 
instructor once tenure has been granted. Today, with tenure 
and academic freedom firmly in place at most institutions of 
higher education, questions concerning the legal relevance of 
these concepts within the court system have been raised as 
faculty bring legal proceedings against their institutions for 
their dismissal regardless of if tenure has been granted. 
III. A REVIEW OF GARCETTI (GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS – 2006) 
Although Garceti does not directly address higher 
education, the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision affect academia.25  University administrations utilize 
 
 22  Also known as the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944. 
 23  Kathryn Moore, Introduction: Academic Tenure in the United States, C. & U. 
PERS. ASS’N J., Fall–Winter 1980, at 1, 4–5. 
 24  PHILIP ALTBACH, ET AL., AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (2011). 
 25  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 US 410, 425 (2006). 
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the Court’s ruling in determining a professor’s right to 
academic freedom. Richard Ceballos was employed by the Los 
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office as a Deputy District 
Attorney in 1989.26  In 1998, Ceballos was promoted to 
calendar deputy27 in the Pomona branch of the District 
Attorney’s office.28 While working at the branch office, Ceballos 
was approached by Richard Escobedo, a criminal defense 
attorney representing a defendant who was charged through 
the Pomona branch office (at the time, Ceballos was one of the 
deputy district attorney’s working on People v. Cuskey [2000]).29  
While in a conversation with Ceballos, Escobedo expressed his 
belief that one of the deputies that had arrested his client lied 
in the search warrant affidavit and requested that Ceballos 
review the case.30 After reviewing the case file and visiting the 
scene of the crime, Ceballos determined that the deputy sheriff 
in question had grossly misrepresented the facts in the case.31 
Upon arriving at his determination, Ceballos took his 
findings to his supervisor (Carol Najera) and the Head Deputy 
District Attorney (Frank Sundstedt) for the county.32  After 
meeting with both individuals, it was determined by all that 
the evidence presented by the sheriff was questionable.33  
Therefore, on March 2, 2000, Ceballos submitted a formal 
memorandum to Sundstedt stating that the affidavit had been 
falsified and recommended that the case be dismissed.34 
When the memorandum from Ceballos was received by the 
Head Deputy District Attorney, Sundstedt contacted Ceballos 
and instructed him to reword his memorandum so that it was 
not overly critical of the arresting sheriff.35  Following the 
direction of the Head Deputy District Attorney, Ceballos 
reworked his memorandum and resubmitted it to Sundstedt.  
On March 9, 2000 a meeting was called with several 
representatives from the sheriff’s department, the Head 
 
 26  Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 27  A Calendar Deputy is a supervisory position that oversees other deputy 
district attorneys. 
 28  Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1170. 
 29  Id. at 1171 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. 
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Deputy District Attorney, Najera and Ceballos to discuss the 
concerns identified by Ceballos in his memorandum.36  At the 
completion of this meeting, Sundstedt was still not convinced 
that the charges should be dismissed and decided to proceed 
with the case pending the outcome of a motion submitted by 
Escobedo challenging the search warrant.37 
After being made aware of Sundstedt’s decision to pursue 
the case, Ceballos contacted Escobedo to inform him that he 
believed the affidavit for the search warrant was falsified.38  
Upon hearing Ceballos’ doubt regarding the validity of the 
warrant, Escobedo decided to subpoena Ceballos to testify on 
the legality of the search warrant affidavit.39  Following his 
testimony at the hearing on the motion challenging the validity 
of the search warrant affidavit, Ceballos was removed from the 
prosecution team involved with the case against Escobedo’s 
client.40  According to Ceballos, following his testimony in court 
regarding the facts behind the awarding of the search warrant, 
Garcetti (the District Attorney), Sundstedt and Najera 
retaliated against him.41 
Claiming that he had been subjected to adverse 
employment actions, Ceballos filed a suit against Sundstedt 
and Najera in their individual capacities and against Garcetti 
in his individual and official capacities, requesting the court 
find for him, his lost wages and injunctive relief.42  Responding 
to the claims against them, the defendants petitioned the 
United States District Court for the Central District of 
California for summary judgment based on their Eleventh 
Amendment rights.43  These rights were granted by the Court.44 
Furthermore, the defendants claimed that the issues raised by 
the plaintiff resulted from a staffing shortage and were in no 
way retaliation for the memorandum that he had sent.45  Upon 
being notified of the defendant’s claims that there was no 
retaliation, Ceballos amended his complaint and resubmitted it 
 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. at 1171–72. 
 42  Id. at 1172. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. 
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to the Court, noting that his First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights were violated when the Los Angeles County District 
Attorney’s Office retaliated against him for his use of speech as 
protected by the First Amendment.46 
The defendants responded to the plaintiff’s claims alleging 
that they should be granted summary judgment based on their 
qualified immunity.47  To support their claim, Garcetti, 
Sundstedt and Najera argued that: “1) . . .[p]laintiff’s speech 
(the March 2, 2000 memorandum) was not protected by the 
First Amendment; 2) even if the Court finds such speech was 
protected, the right violated was not ‘clearly established’; and 
3) the defendants’ actions were reasonable under the 
circumstances.”48 In its ruling, the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California stated that Ceballos’s 
claim of First Amendment protection for his March 2, 2000 
memorandum was unsupported by evidence, and that because 
the speech in question was not a matter of public concern, as 
defined in Connick,49 the defendant’s request for summary 
judgment was awarded.50 
Upon receiving the verdict from the District Court, Ceballos 
decided to challenge the decision of the Court and submitted an 
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.51  In his appeal, Ceballos alleged that his use of 
protected speech in the March 2, 2000 memorandum resulted 
in being subjected to adverse employment actions by Garcetti, 
Sundstedt and Najera.52  Additionally, Ceballos argued that the 
District Court erred when it awarded the defendants the right 
to qualified immunity.53 Citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) in 
his defense, Ceballos stated that for a public official to receive 
qualified immunity, the person must have acted in a manner 
that did not violate “clearly established . . . constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”54 
 
 46  See id. 
 47  Id. 
 48  Ceballos v. Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002). 
 49  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (The US Supreme Court indicated that 
for an employee’s speech to be considered a matter of public concern, the speech had to 
address issues relating to political, social, or other concerns to the community). 
 50  Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039. 
 51  See Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1170. 
 52  Id. 
 53  See id. 
 54  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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During the Ninth Circuit’s examination of the evidence, it 
identified that, for the purpose of summary judgment, qualified 
immunity was not available to the state or county officials 
because Ceballos’s speech was considered a matter of public 
concern and, as such, was protected by the First Amendment.55  
Furthermore, the Court identified that “. . .[because] the 
Eleventh Amendment does not apply to political subdivisions of 
the state, the county could ordinarily not assert sovereign 
immunity, although in this case it could do so if such immunity 
applied to the District Attorney.”56  However, regarding the 
District Attorney’s ability to receive protection under sovereign 
immunity, the Court noted that because Garcetti’s actions were 
not deemed as the function of the state or county, he was 
disqualified from receiving protection from the Eleventh 
Amendment.57 
The Court addressed Ceballos’ claim of protected speech by 
referencing the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Connick, noting 
that when an employee discusses matters of a personal nature 
in the workplace, such as soliciting an individual’s colleagues to 
determine their perception of topics to promote a personal 
interest, the employee’s speech is not protected by the First 
Amendment.58  The Court further referenced Connick when it 
addressed the matter of an employee’s use of speech to discuss 
“the issue of whether assistant district attorneys are pressured 
to work in political campaigns is a matter of interest to the 
community upon which it is essential that public employees be 
able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”59  
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further 
proceedings.60 
Upon learning of the Court of Appeals ruling, Garcetti 
submitted an appeal to the United States Supreme Court.  
Following the conclusion of the arguments in the case, the 
Supreme Court issued its ruling in which it stated that: 
1) When public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, such employees are not speaking as private 
 
 55  Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1174. 
 56   Id. at 1170. 
 57   Id. 
 58  See id. at 1173–74 
 59  Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. 
 60  Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1185. 
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citizens for First Amendment purposes, and thus the First 
Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline of such 
employees for such speech; 2) This result was consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s precedents to the effect that government 
employees who make public statements outside the course of 
performing official duties retain some possibility of First 
Amendment protection; 3) This holding likewise was supported 
by the emphasis of the Supreme Court’s precedents on 
affording government employers sufficient discretion to 
manage their operations; 4)  A contrary rule would commit 
state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive 
role involving judicial oversight of communications among 
government employees and their superiors in the course of 
official business; 5) The deputy’s allegation of unconstitutional 
retaliation failed, for the deputy had spoken, a)  not as a 
private citizen and b) pursuant to his official duties as a 
prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor 
about how best to proceed with a pending case.61 
The Court further explained that similar to Pickering, the 
Court faces the challenge of trying to provide a balance 
between an individual commenting upon a matter of public 
concern and the State, as an employer, providing a service to 
the public through its employees.62  According to the Court, and 
referencing their decision in Pickering, it stated: 
[In circumstances where] a teacher has made erroneous 
public statements upon issues then currently the subject of 
public attention, which are critical of his ultimate employer 
but which are neither shown nor can be presumed to have in 
any way either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of 
his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with 
the regular operation of the schools generally. . . . [T]he 
interest of the school administration in limiting teachers’ 
opportunities to contribute to public debate is not 
significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar 
contribution by any member of the general public.63 
As a result of their decision in Pickering, the Court 
developed a three step approach for courts to use when 
determining what constitutional protections can be awarded to 
 
 61  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
 62   Id. at 416. 
 63  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., 391 U.S. 
563, 572–573 (1968). 
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a public employee’s speech.64  First, the court must determine if 
the individual’s speech is considered a matter of public 
concern.65  If the answer to this question is yes, then the 
individual’s speech is awarded the protection of the First 
Amendment; however, if the answer to the question is no, then 
the individual has no claim against his/her employer for the 
employer’s reaction based on the individual’s speech.66 
Similarly, in the case of Garcetti, the government as an 
employer has the discretion to restrict an employee’s speech, 
but when doing so, the employing agency must be certain that 
the restrictions imposed on the individual’s speech are in 
response to the individual’s speech and how that speech could 
negatively affect the individual’s work performance and thus, 
the organization’s ability to perform.67 
The Court continued in its ruling by referencing Waters v. 
Churchill.68  In that case the Court stated that “[T]he 
government as employer indeed has far broader powers than 
does the government as sovereign”69 and as such 
“. . .[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a 
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and 
actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient 
provision of public services.”70 Applying their statement from 
Waters to Garcetti, the Court stated that as a result of Ceballos’ 
submitting a memorandum to his supervisor, an action that 
was identified as not being outside the realm of his 
responsibilities as a calendar deputy, his speech used was not 
that of a citizen but rather of an employee. As such, it was 
classified as not a matter of public concern; therefore, the 
protection of the First Amendment was not awarded.71 
However, in the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case, the 
Justices indicated that the “. . .expression related to academic 
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this 
Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need 
 
 64  Id. at 568 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418. 
 68  Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
 69  Id. at 671. 
 70  Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 418. 
 71  Id. at 423. 
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not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we 
conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”72  
Furthermore, in support of the rights awarded to an academic’s 
freedom of speech in the classroom, the Court referred to 
Keyishian in which it had stated that “. . .[o]ur Nation is deeply 
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers 
concerned.  That freedom is therefore a special concern of the 
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall 
of orthodoxy over the classroom.”73  The decision handed down 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Garcetti reversed the Court of 
Appeals decision and remanded the case back to the lower 
court for further proceedings. 
The question of an employee’s speech and the protection it 
is guaranteed by the First Amendment becomes a key element 
raised within Garcetti.74  In the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling, 
the Court reasoned that when an employee uses speech in 
his/her daily job, and that speech is considered to be within the 
realm of that individual’s responsibility, his/her speech is not 
considered a matter of public concern, and does not receive the 
protection of the First Amendment.  However, even though the 
Court identified work related speech as being outside the realm 
of the protection of the First Amendment, the Court did 
indicate that the decision reached in Garcetti did not imperil 
the First Amendment protection awarded to educators in public 
institutions of higher learning.75 
IV. GARCETTI REFERENCED IN HIGHER EDUCATION CASES 
A. Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina – 
Wilmington (2011) 
One case in which a lower court referred to the application 
of Garcetti in higher education is that of Adams v. Trustees of 
the University of North Carolina-Wilmington (2011).76  In this 
 
 72  Id. at 425. 
 73  Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967). 
 74  See Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410–26. 
 75  Id. at 425. 
 76  640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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case, Adams was employed as an assistant professor at the 
University of North Carolina, Wilmington Campus in the 
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice.77  During his 
probationary period Adams received high teaching evaluations 
from his supervisor and students, received two faculty awards, 
had articles published and was an active participant in 
university related service activities.78  Upon the completion of 
his probationary period, without question from his peers and 
university administration, Adams received tenure and the new 
academic rank of associate professor. 
Several years after his promotion, Adams changed his 
religious beliefs and became a conservative Christian, a change 
that redefined his moral and ideological views.79  As his 
religious beliefs grew stronger, he became increasingly vocal 
about his views on the moral and political state of the 
university and nation.80  In 2004, he published a book entitled, 
“Welcome to the Ivory Tower of Babel: Confessions of a 
Conservative College Professor” which contained past articles 
as well as new works he had written.81  Although his views on 
the moral well-being of the nation had changed, his ability to 
be an effective teacher had not, and he continued to receive 
positive reviews from his supervisor and students.82 
Over the years, Adams became even more vocal in his views 
and tension developed between him and several of his 
colleagues.  As these tensions mounted, complaints concerning 
his public beliefs and values from the Board of Trustees and 
the surrounding community began to find their way to the 
university administration.83  However, even though the 
university administration did not support Adams’ views or the 
way he presented them to the public, they recognized his right 
to freedom of speech and academic freedom and agreed that he 
was able to express his thoughts without the fear of retaliation 
from the administration. 
Several months after publishing his book, Adams submitted 
his application for promotion to full professor.  According to the 
 
 77  Id. at 553. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. at 554 
 83  Id. 
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Faculty Handbook at the University of North Carolina-
Wilmington, faculty promotion is reviewed in four areas: 1) 
teaching ability; 2) research conducted or artistic achievement; 
3) service to the university and community, and 4) scholarship 
and professional development completed.84  In addition to these 
four areas, the review process for promotion placed an 
emphasis on the significance of teaching excellence and 
research conducted or artistic achievement attained, items that 
carry the most weight in the decision process for the awarding 
of promotion and tenure.85  Adams included all of the required 
documents in his application packet plus a list of his published 
and pending publications, including the Welcome to the Ivory 
Tower of Babel: Confessions of a Conservative College 
Professor.86 
After completing his application for promotion, Adams 
submitted his packet to the department chairperson, Dr. 
Kimberly Cook.87  Following promotion guidelines identified 
within the Faculty Handbook, Cook forwarded Adams’ packet 
to the senior most department faculty members requesting 
their feedback on Adams’ request for promotion.88  Upon 
receiving the recommendation from the senior faculty 
members, Cook compiled their responses and placed them in a 
document that summarized the overall themes of the comments 
submitted by the senior faculty.89 Cook then called a meeting 
with the senior faculty members to discuss their comments and 
recommendations.90  During this meeting, the scholarly works 
Adams had submitted were evaluated for their scholarly 
content.91  According to those who participated in the meeting, 
the scholarly work was difficult to review because “they were 
not peer-reviewed or traditional academic writing related to his 
academic discipline.”92 As a result, the department denied 
Adams’ request for promotion.93 
 
 84  Faculty Handbook, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA- WILMINGTON, (2013), 
available at, http://uncw.edu/facsen/documents/2012_Faculty_Handbook.pdf. 
 85  Adams, 640 F.3d at 556. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 555 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. 
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Upon receiving notification of denial for his promotion, 
Adams requested a written response from the department 
chair identifying the reasons for the denial of his promotion.94  
In her response to Adams, Cook explained that the decision  
. . .was based exclusively on the promotion application and 
supplementary materials [that he had] submitted and [with 
Cook’s] consultation with the senior faculty in accordance 
with existing UNCW . . . policies and procedures. [Cook] 
indicated an overwhelming consensus of the senior faculty did 
not support the promotion and found the lack of support from 
the senior faculty provided compelling evidence that Adams’ 
record [did] not merit promotion to professor at [that] time.95 
Adams followed the receipt of Cook’s explanation by filing a 
claim with the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of North Carolina in which he stated that the 
University of North Carolina – Wilmington had violated his 
First Amendment rights and retaliated against him stating 
that the university’s decision to deny him promotion was based 
on his protected speech.96  Furthermore, Adams claimed that 
he had been denied the constitutionally protected right to due 
process.97 
The defendants, who had been named in their individual 
and official capacities, requested summary judgment in this 
case and that the claims against them be dismissed in 
accordance to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).98 After 
granting the motion submitted by the defense, the District 
Court referred to Garcetti where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that when a public employee is speaking in his official capacity, 
he is not speaking as a citizen.99  In the Court’s decision in 
Adams, they indicated that the focus of this case was not 
placed on the speech itself, but the role of the speaker when it 
was said. 
Adams appealed the District Court’s decision to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.  In filing his 
 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. at 556. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) calls for the dismissal of 
charges if it appears to the court that the plaintiff cannot provide support to their 
claims that would entitle them to relief. 
 99   Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006). 
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appeal, Adams submitted claims based on several actions 
committed by the university: 1) the university had violated his 
First Amendment rights by basing their decision for his 
request of promotion on his protected speech; and 2) that the 
university had violated his right to equal protection awarded 
him under the Fourteenth Amendment.100 
In deciding this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit indicated that the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment for the defendant on his First 
Amendment claims.  However, basing their opinion on 
Pickering and Garcetti, the Court further explained that “while 
government employees do not lose their constitutional rights at 
work, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 
government may impose certain restraints on its employees’ 
speech and take action against them that would be 
unconstitutional if applied to the general public.”101  In making 
this point, the Court referenced their ruling in McVey v. Stacy 
(1998), identifying the complexity between a public employee 
acting as a citizen when the employee has commented on 
matters of public concern and the ability of government acting 
as an employer by providing a public service.  In this case the 
Court had to determine: 
1) whether the public employee was speaking as a citizen 
upon a matter of public concern or as an employee about a 
matter of personal interest; 
2) whether the employee’s interest in speaking upon the 
matter of public concern outweighed the government’s 
interest in providing effective and efficient services to the 
public; or 
3) whether the employee’s speech was a substantial factor in 
the employee’s [adverse employment] decision.102 
Referencing the McVey test, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
stated that the District Court had erred when it had only 
applied the first step of the test and identified that Adams had 
spoken in his official capacity and not that of a citizen.103  
Furthermore, the Court explained that the lower court had 
 
 100  Adams, 640 F.3d at 557. 
 101  Id. at 560. 
 102  McVey v. Stacy, 157 F 3d 271, 277–78 (4th Cir. 1998) (this three prong test is 
known as the McVey test). 
 103  Adams, 640 F.3d at 561. 
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misinterpreted Garcetti in several areas.  According to the 
Court, the District Court faltered when it: 1) held that 
protected speech was converted to unprotected speech based on 
its use after the fact; and 2) applied Garcetti without 
acknowledging the language used within the Supreme Court’s 
decision indicating that the Court’s analysis on freedom of 
speech did not apply to education.104  Furthermore, the Appeals 
Court stated that the District Court faltered when it concluded 
that Adams’ speech, which had been protected by the First 
Amendment, had turned into unprotected speech after the 
speech had been made.105  In its decision, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling 
on summary judgment on Adams’ First Amendment claims.106  
The Court remanded the case back to the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of North Carolina for further 
proceedings.107 
The Adams case challenged academic freedom.  The 
Appeals Court’s ruling stated that “the underlying right Adams 
asserts the Defendants violated — that of a public employee to 
speak as a citizen on matters of public concern — is clearly 
established and something a reasonable person in the 
Defendants’ position should have known was protected.”108  The 
purpose of academic freedom is to protect faculty members’ 
freedom of speech without the fear of reprimand from their 
employer.  Finally, in its decision, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit stated, “we conclude Adams’ speech was clearly 
that of a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern.  
Adams’ columns addressed topics such as academic freedom, 
civil rights, campus culture, sex, feminism, abortion, 
homosexuality, religion, and morality.  Such topics plainly 
touched on issues of public, rather than private, concern.”109 
B. Demers v. Austin (2013) 
Demars v. Austin is a recent case that references Garcetti 
and is similar to Adams. In this case, David Demers, a tenured 
 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. at 566. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. at 565. 
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faculty member at Washington State University (WSU), was 
employed within the University’s College of Liberal Arts.110  
While performing his duties as a faculty member, Demers 
distributed a controversial seven step plan calling for the 
separation of the College’s communication school into two 
different faculty groups, Mass Communication and 
Communication Studies.111  A committee was eventually 
formed (the Structure Committee) to research the feasibility for 
separating the communication school (the Murrow School) into 
two separate schools.112  Their resulting proposition created a 
rift among those employed within the school of 
communication.113 
While serving as a member of the Structure Committee, 
Demers proposed a plan (The Plan) defining seven reasons for 
separating the school into two distinct departments and 
submitted The Plan to the Provost of the University.114  After 
waiting several months and receiving no feedback from the 
Provost, Demers submitted his plan to his faculty colleagues, 
the university administration, the advisory board for the 
Murrow School and the President of the University.115  Shortly 
after the dissemination of The Plan to the community at large, 
the faculty at WSU began to receive questions from the public 
related to Demers’s proposal.116 
During the time relevant to The Plan being made available 
to the public, Demers submitted his annual self-prepared 
faculty evaluation report to the interim director of the Murrow 
School, Dr. Erica Austin.117  As defined within WSU’s faculty 
manual, each faculty member’s annual review should include 
“a curriculum vitae that will include information concerning 
education, instructional performance, research activities and 
publications”118 Following these guidelines, Demers submitted 
his report which included a book he had authored which 
 
 110  Demers v. Austin, 729 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir.,2013). 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. 
 115  Id. at 1016. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. 
 118  2012–2013 Faculty Manual 63, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY, available at 
http://facsen.wsu.edu/faculty_manual/2013facman_updatedTOC061413a.pdf. 
(A policy that is still evident in the most current version of the faculty manual). 
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criticized academia and WSU entitled The Ivory Tower of 
Babel.119 
After receiving several negative annual evaluations from 
the interim director (from 2006 to 2008), Demers submitted a 
claim to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Washington alleging that the university 
administration had retaliated against him for his publication of 
The Plan and The Ivory Tower of Babel, claiming both were 
protected under the First Amendment of the Constitution.120 
In response to the claims made by the plaintiff, the 
defendants claimed that the plaintiff’s negative yearly 
evaluations were in response to Demers’ redirected priorities 
away from the position for which he was hired in academia, his 
lack of attendance at institutional committees, and the fact 
that he frequently cancelled his classes – all of which violated 
university policy.121  Furthermore, the defendants claimed that 
with the decision reached in Garcetti by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Demers’s publications were pursuant to his official 
duties at the university and should not be awarded First 
Amendment protection.122 The District Court’s ruling “held that 
[T]he Plan and Ivory Tower [of Babel] were written and 
distributed in the performance of Demers’s official duties as a 
faculty member of WSU, and were therefore not protected 
under the First Amendment.”123 
Demers appealed the District Court’s decision to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that: 1) 
his publication of The Plan and the Ivory Tower of Babel were 
not pursuant to his position at the university; and 2) even if the 
publication of The Plan and the Ivory Tower of Babel were 
pursuant to his official duties, the ruling in Garcetti did not 
apply to faculty speech and academic writing.124 
In deciding the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit first addressed Demers’s claim that his 
publication of The Plan and the Ivory Tower of Babel were not 
pursuant to his official duties at WSU.  In their review of the 
evidence, the Court stated that as Demers was “preparing 
 
 119  Demers, 729 F.3d at 1014. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. at 1017. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. at 1017–18. 
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[T]he [P]lan, [he] sent an email to his fellow faculty members 
at the Murrow School, soliciting ideas and comments.”125  
Furthermore, the Court identified that within his 2007 annual 
self-prepared faculty report, Demers listed that he had 
“[d]eveloped a 7-Step Plan for reorganizing the Murrow School 
to improve the quality of the professional programs and attract 
more developmental funds.”126  According to the Court: 
it is impossible, as a real-world practical matter, to separate 
Demers’s position as a member of the Mass Communication 
faculty, and as a member of the Structure Committee, from 
his preparation and distribution of his Plan.  Furthermore, we 
note that when it was to his advantage to do so, Demers 
characterized his development of the Plan as part of his 
official duties in his 2007 Annual Activities Report.127 
However, basing their opinion on Garcetti, the Court 
referenced U.S. Supreme Court Justice Souter when he stated, 
“I have to hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil 
First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public 
colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and 
write ‘pursuant to. . .official duties.’”128  Referencing Keyishian 
v. the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New 
York (1967), as well as the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit in Adams, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit stated that “teaching and academic writing are 
at the core of the official duties of teachers and professors. Such 
teaching and writing are ‘a special concern of the First 
Amendment.’”129  In the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit’s final summation of the case presented before them, 
the Court stated, “[w]e conclude that Garcetti does not – 
indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, cannot – apply 
to teaching and academic writing that are performed ‘pursuant 
to the official duties’ of a teacher and professor.  We hold that 
academic employee speech not covered by Garcetti is protected 
under the First Amendment, using the analysis established in 
Pickering.”130 
In Demers’ case, the concept of academic freedom was 
 
 125  Id. at 1018. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Id. 
 128 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 438 (2006). 
 129  Demers, 729 F.3d at 1019. 
 130  Id. at 1020. 
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challenged when a professor’s academic speech and writing 
were linked in similar fashion to the definition of employee 
speech identified within Garcetti.  However, the Court’s ruling 
stated that “protected academic writing is not confined to 
scholarship. . .academics, in the course of their academic 
duties, also write memoranda, reports, and other documents 
addressed to things such as budget, curriculum, departmental 
structure, and faculty hiring.  [S]uch writing may well address 
matters of public concern under Pickering.”131  The purpose of 
academic freedom, one that is well supported within the U.S. 
legal system, is to protect a faculty members’ freedom of speech 
even if his/her actions are pursuant to their official duties at a 
university.  In its decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit stated that “[w]e hold that there is an exception to 
Garcetti for teaching and academic writing.”132 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the protections awarded the professoriate through 
academic freedom and freedom of speech were clearly 
established in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University 
of the State of New York (1967), these principles are once again 
being challenged within the U.S. legal system.  As seen in the 
two United States Court of Appeals’ cases discussed in this 
article, the application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Garcetti has been erroneously applied towards a professor’s 
academic writings and academic speech by university 
administration and District Courts alike. 
If Garcetti, and its categorical approach to defining 
employee speech as an unprotected right of the First 
Amendment, is applied in higher education without university 
administration and the district courts first understanding the 
Supreme Court’s meaning of employee speech and how it 
applies within higher education, professors will receive little or 
no protection from the disciplinary action of university 
administrators for the professor’s use of speech and academic 
writing that has been classified as being pursuant to their 
official duties at their university.133  However, in most cases, 
 
 131  Id. at 1023. 
 132  Id. at 1025. 
 133  Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST 
AMEND. LAW REV. 54, 56–57 (2008). 
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university administrators do not act out against academic 
freedom because of their disdain for it,134 but rather out of their 
lack of an understanding of the protections awarded faculty for 
their academic writings and academic speech. 
With the decisions of the lower courts in these cases being 
reversed by various U.S. Courts of Appeals (as seen in Adams 
and Demers), the constitutionally protected rights of academics 
for their academic speech and writing is being recognized as a 
First Amendment protection.  As social and political events 
within higher education over the past several years have led 
university administrators to question the parameters of 
Constitutional protections and challenge the academic’s right 
to freedom of speech, the U.S. legal system has remained firm 
in its interpretation of the law by protecting a professor’s civil 
rights as well as those rights awarded to their academic speech 
and writings.135 
Those working as professionals within higher education 
need first to understand the Supreme Court’s ruling in Garcetti 
prior to applying it as a way to regulate a faculty member’s 
academic speech or writing.  In Garcetti the Supreme Court 
held that when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, such employees are not speaking as private 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and thus “the First 
Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline of such 
employees for such speech.”136  Unfortunately, simply taking 
this statement and applying it to issues related to academic 
freedom is where many university administrators have fallen 
short.  University administrators must not only recognize the 
language, but also understand that Garcetti further defines a 
professor’s freedom of speech.  Within the Supreme Court’s 
decision the Court states: “. . .expression related to academic 
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this 
Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need 
not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we 
conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case 
 
 134  Kevin Cope, Defending the Ivory Tower: A Twenty-First Century Approach to 
the Pickering-Connick Doctrine and Public Higher Education Faculty after Garcetti, 33 
J.C. & U.L. 313, 360 (2007). 
 135  Id. 
 136  Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 424. 
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involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”137  As 
evident from this review of the cases, the U.S. legal system 
supports the issue of Freedom of Speech, i.e., academic 
freedom, for those in education.  This support is most notable 
in the following passage from Keyishian: “. . .[o]ur Nation is 
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is 
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the 
teachers concerned.  That freedom is therefore a special 
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws 




 137  Id. at 425. 
 138  Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967). 
